Mr. President, The Senate

is engaged in a momentous and historic

debate. The President seeks the authority

to use force in our on-going

confrontation with Iraq.

The Constitution entrusts the Congress

with the exclusive power to ‘‘declare

War.’’ It is our Constitutional obligation

to consider the President’s request

carefully and conscientiously, to

review the evidence thoroughly, to

weigh the costs and the consequences.

We are called upon by the Constitution

to make an independent judgment, not

an automatic acquiescence.

I begin this debate acknowledging

several unassailable conclusions.

First, we are already in a confrontation

with Iraq. Since the Persian Gulf

War, we have maintained military

forces in support of international sanctions

against the regime of Saddam

Hussein. Our pilots are routinely fired

upon as they enforce the ‘‘No Fly’’

Zones. Thus, the question is not whether

we should confront Iraq. The question

is how best to thwart this outlaw

regime and for what ultimate purpose.

Second, Saddam Hussein is a despicable

person who oppresses his people

as he threatens his neighbors. Despite

his military defeat in the Persian Gulf

War and the imposition of sanctions,

Saddam continues to defy United Nations

resolutions and, of most concern,

continues to develop and attempts to

acquire weapons of mass destruction.

But, our judgment cannot rest simply

on his unalloyed evil. We must consider

our actions more broadly. Will we enhance

the stability and security of the

region? Will we strengthen our security

not just for the moment, but for the future

as well? What kind of precedent

will we establish?

Third, we will decisively defeat Iraqi

military forces in any conflict. The

skill and courage of our forces, aided

by superb technology, will overwhelm

Iraqi resistance. The military outcome

is certain, but the costs and the consequences

are uncertain and could be

quite grave.

As I consider the proper course of action,

as I weigh the uncertainties as

well as recognize what is apparent, I

return again and again to one further

conclusion. Whatever we do will be better

done with others. Thus, it is imperative

that we commit all of our energies

to encourage the United Nations

to live up to its founding principles: to

be more than just an international

forum for discussion; indeed, to be a

force for collective action in the face of

common dangers. President Bush said

it very well when he addressed the

United Nations’ General Assembly:

Acting alone will increase the risk to

our forces and to our allies in the region.

Acting alone will increase the

burden that we must bear to restore

stability in the region. Acting alone

will invite the criticism and animosity

of many throughout the world who will

mistakenly dismiss our efforts as entirely

self-serving. Acting alone could

seriously undermine the structure of

collective security that the United

States has labored for decades to make

effective. Acting alone today against

the palpable evil of Saddam may set us

on a course, charted by the newly announced

doctrine of preemption, that

will carry us beyond the limits of our

power and our wisdom.

For these reasons, I will vote against

the Lieberman-Warner resolution

granting the President the permission

to take unilateral military action

against Iraq regardless of the immediacy

of the threat. And I will support

the resolution proposed by Senator

LEVIN.

The Levin resolution recognizes the

inherent right of the President to use

our military forces to defend the

United States. This resolution supports

the President’s demands that the

United Nations promulgate a tough,

new framework of inspections to disarm

Iraq, and this resolution gives the

President the right to use American

military forces to enforce the resolve

of the United Nations. The Levin resolution

recognizes Congress’ responsibility

to promptly consider the President’s

request to unilaterally employ

American forces if the United Nations

fails to take effective action.

On Monday in Cincinnati, President

Bush said, ‘‘Later this week the United

States Congress will vote on this matter.

I have asked the Congress to authorize

the use of America’s military,

if it proves necessary, to enforce U.N.

Security Council demands.’’ That is

what the Levin resolution provides.

Those who advocate unilateral action

assume that time has run out in dealing

with Iraq. They see an immediate

threat that will yield only to immediate

military action. Thus, it is important

to assess the Iraqi threat as

best we can.

Iraqi conventional forces have been

seriously degraded since the Gulf War.

Saddam does have a cadre of Republican

Guards that are capable and

fought with determination in the Gulf

War. One cannot totally discount Iraq’s

conventional forces, but they are not

capable of defeating United States

forces. The most dangerous aspect of

Saddam’s military power is the possession

of chemical and biological weapons

and his aspiration to develop or acquire

nuclear weapons.

Today, Iraq has the capability to use

chemical and biological weapons within

the region to augment conventional

forces that have been seriously degraded

since the Gulf War. These capabilities,

however, must be viewed in

terms of intentions in order to fully

evaluate the threat

An assessment of Iraq intentions reveals

areas of consensus and areas of

disagreement. It seems clear that Saddam

is intent on rebuilding his military

and acquiring weapons of mass destruction

including nuclear devices.

His expulsion of U.N. inspectors certainly

supports this view. Moreover, it

may suggest that the inspectors posed

a very difficult obstacle to his plans

and their future utility cannot be summarily

dismissed. Saddam continues to

aspire to be a regional power. Unchecked,

Saddam would threaten his

neighbors and endeavor to claim the

mantel of leadership in the Gulf and,

perhaps, in the greater Muslim world.

There is, however, a lack of consensus

on two significant points. Will

Saddam risk the survival of his regime

by threatening or conducting attacks

on his neighbors? Will Saddam provide

weapons of mass destruction to terrorist

groups who can or will use them

against the United States or any other

nation?

At the heart of discussions of

Saddam’s possible plans is the general

question of whether deterrence and

containment will work against Iraq as

it did in the Cold War. Saddam certainly

has a lot to lose in any conflict

with the United States. Both his life

and his lifestyle would be in great jeopardy.

Saddam also seems to be devoid

of any ideology other than self-preservation

and self-aggrandizement. Saddam

is a secular thug, not a messianic

leader. There is evidence that he will

not put his regime at risk. During the

Gulf war, the United States clearly signaled

that any use of Iraq of chemical

or biological weapons against Coalition

forces would result in his destruction.

Saddam accepted a humiliating defeat

rather than risk losing power.

Of course, there are many who accurately

point out that Saddam has already

attacked his neighbors, Iran and

Kuwait. He has used chemical weapons

against the Iranians and the Kurds.

Still, one is left with the question

whether even this despicable behavior

is a product of calculation rather than

delusion.

And complicating the record of his

actions against Iran is mounting evidence

of our covert support both before

and after he had begun to employ

chemical weapons.

The second issues involves Saddam’s

willingness and ability to cooperate

with terrorists. After September 11,

this issue takes on a new and powerful

emphasis. Despite extraordinary and

justifiable efforts to establish a connection

between the Iraqi regime and

the attacks on New York City and the

Pentagon and the downed aircraft in

Pennsylvania, no such links have been

established. Indeed, if credible links

exist, the President, in my view, could

employ unilateral force under the

terms of the congressional resolution

passed on September 14, 2001.

Recently, however, administration

officials are publicly, but cryptically,

trying to make the case that there is a

definite connection between the Iraqi

regime and al-Qaida. Secretary Rumsfeld

and Condolezza Rice have asserted

at various times that Iraq is harboring

al-Qaida fighters in Iraq, that information

from detainees indicates that Iraq

provided chem-bio weapons training to

al-Qaida, and that senior-level contacts

between the Iraq regime and al-Qaida

have increased since 1998. They have offered

few details beyond Secretary

Rumsfeld’s claims that the information

is ‘‘factual,’’ extremely accurate’’ and

‘‘bulletproof.’’

But according to the Philadelphia Inquirer,

these claims are disputed by ‘‘a

growing number of military officers,

intelligence professionals and diplomats.’’

The article quotes an

unnamed official declaring:

The Inquirer article examined some

of these administration claims and

found that ‘‘the facts are much less

conclusive.’’

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent

to have this article printed in the

RECORD.

There being no objection, the article

was ordered to be printed in the

RECORD, as follows:

In addition, a full assessment

of the assertions of Secretary

Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor

Rice is hampered by the failure of

the Central Intelligence Agency to provide

an updated National Intelligence

Estimate of the current situation in

Iraq.

Given the subjective nature and inherent

difficulty of evaluating the intentions

of such an opaque structure as

the Iraqi regime, much more weight

must be given to their capabilities.

Saddam does not deserve the benefit of

the doubt. But looking at Iraqi capabilities

alone, the threat is not immediate.

If unchecked, the threat is inevitable

and dangerous. But, at time have

the opportunity to pursue a collective

solution to Iraq. This is an approach

that offers a greater chance of success

and a greater chance of long-term stability.

Whatever course of action that we

choose, we cannot absolutely ignore or

disregard the views and opinions of

other countries. With the exception of

Great Britain, there are few nations

that are supportive of unilateral action.

The nations that surround Iraq are

critical to the success of any military

operation and to the long-term success

of our policy. And, regional support for

unilateral American military operations

is equivocal at best.

Turkey seems likely to allow use of

its airbases but without great enthusiasm

and with great concern about the

Kurds. Saudi Arabia opposes toppling

Saddam and has stated it will allow the

use of its bases only if the operation is

authorized by the United Nations. The

potential loss of Saudi bases and overflight

rights will limit our flexibility.

King Abdullah of Jordan has described

a military confrontation with Iraq as a

‘‘catastrophe’’ for the region. His reluctant

support is based on our commitment

not to seek permission to introduce

American forces into Jordan.

The Iranians have declared their intentions

to remain aloof from the conflict.

Iran is a bitter foe of Iraq, but its

government is no friend to America.

The gulf states seem resigned to the

possibility of war. Mubarak of Egypt

has repeatedly spoken out against a

unilateral attack, and it is unclear

whether Egypt will allow the use of its

airfields.

As the New York Times pointed out

with regard to the Gulf Region and the

Middle East:

The support for the United States is not

enthusiastic, and is based on any American

military action having the backing of a

United Nations resolution.

As we debate, the Iraqis are preparing

their responses to our diplomatic

and military initiatives. Their

options are shaped by their capabilities

and, I believe, the lessons learned in

their disastrous defeat in the gulf war

and their study of the success of American

military forces in Bosnia, Kosovo,

and Afghanistan.

Their first option is the one that

they are currently pursuing; the admission

of U.N. weapon inspectors under

the most lenient conditions possible.

The Iraqis are not unmindful that inspectors

in Baghdad are the best insurance

that they can have against a military

attack by the United States. Even

if this Congress authorized the President

to use military force against Iraq

at his sole discretion without regard to

the United Nations, it is difficult to

conceive of the President ordering an

attack with U.N. inspectors in Iraq carrying

out a U.N. resolution and presumably

telling CNN that their mission

is proceeding.

The State Department is engaged in

difficult negotiations to broker a new

resolution while at the same time delaying

the entry of inspectors into

Iraq. If these negotiations fail, the

United States would find itself in a precarious

position. Not only will we be

deprived of a new and strengthened enforcement

mechanism, we likely will

be exerting all our formal and informal

influence to prevent the reintroduction

of inspectors. Blocking the reentry of

inspectors would further isolate us in

the world. If we succeed in brokering a

new and more effective inspection

scheme, there is a significant probability

that Iraq, despite it repeated

defiance and rejection of tougher

standards, will initially comply. Saddam

has consistently practiced the politics

of survival. Accepting inspectors,

even inspectors with unconditional and

unconstrained access, will buy time. If

Saddam refuses to accept inspectors in

accord with a more robust U.N. resolution,

he seals his fate.

The recognition by the administration

that Iraq may capitulate in the

face of a strong Security Council resolution

might tempt them to halfhearted

pursuit of United Nations authority.

They should resist those temptations.

It is clearly preferable to operate

with a U.N. authorization whether

it is contained in one resolution that

promulgates a new inspection scheme

backed by the explicit authorization of

force or a two-staged process that introduces

inspectors with enhanced

powers but defers the question of enforcement

until Iraqi non-compliance

is established.

If inspectors are not reintroduced

into Iraq and Iraq is convinced of a

pending American-led attack, then the

possibility of terrorist attacks by Iraq

within the United States must be considered.

In a letter read before a hearing

of the Senate and House Intelligence

Committees, CIA Director,

George Tenet, stated that:

But, Tenet went on to warn:

And, if Iraq is contemplating terror

in America, then Iraqis are more than

likely to be considering preemptive

strikes on our forces as we build up

prior to an attack. One of the most

compelling lessons of the gulf war and

subsequent American military operations

is that letting the United States

build up its military forces is tantamount

to victory for the United States.

If we can assemble in sufficient numbers

the best warfighters in the world

with the best military technology in

the world, we will win the military battle

every time and certainly in the case

of Iraq.

If Hussein’s goal is to kill U.S. soldiers

and slow down an invasion, he

might strike in the early days of a

campaign at regional ports or airfields

when those facilities are filled to capacity

with U.S. forces gathering for

the fight. In 1997, a Pentagon team of

18 generals and admirals projected different

ways such an attack could take

place. In one scenario, small teams of

Iraqi infiltrators unleashed mustard

gas from an old bread truck outfitted

with agricultural sprayers. In the projected

scenario, the truck was mistakenly

let on base by troops who thought

it was delivering food. In another scenario,

a helicopter took off from a

barge floating about 15 miles from the

Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia

and sprayed cholera into the air, infecting

thousands of U.S. Marines preparing

to board ships. The Marines

didn’t fall ill until they were at sea. Finally,

the generals envisioned speedboats,

loaded with chemical and biological

weapons, ramming into docks

near key U.S. ports in Bahrain and Kuwait.

Added to these scenarios is the

possibility of a missile attack similar

to the one launched against our rear

areas during the gulf war.

A chemical or biological attack on

our forces as they assemble would disrupt

our operations but not ultimately

defeat them. It would increase our casualties

and costs. It also has the potential

to sow panic in civilian ranks and

make our presence a greater burden on

supportive governments.

If Saddam does not choose to launch

preemptive attacks on our build-up,

there is increasing evidence that he

will use chemical and biological weapons

against our forces as they commence

the attack. Last Tuesday Prime

Minister Blair released a report, which

stated that Saddam might have already

delegated authority to employ

chemical and biological weapons to his

youngest son, Qusai, who leads the Republican

Guard. Reportedly, Saddam

had, prior to the start of the 1991 Persian

Gulf ground war, issued specific

orders for the use of WMD if the allies

were winning the ground war and

crossed a line 200 miles south of Baghdad.

Once again, Iraqi chemical or biological

attacks against United States

forces will not halt our attack. American

units are trained and equipped to

operate in chemical or biological environments.

However, such attacks can

cause delay, disruption and increased

casualties. General Hoar, former

CENTCOM Commander, testified before

the Armed Services Committee that

prior to offensive operations in 1991, he

was briefed on a simulation conducted

at Quantico that indicated the possibility

of 10,000 casualties to the assaulting

Coalition forces due principally

to the potential use of chemical

and biological weapons. We have improved

our protective equipment and

monitors since the gulf war. We have

devoted great effort to developing techniques

to target and suppress opposing

systems that could deliver chemical

and biological weapons. Nevertheless,

chemical and biological attacks would

pose serious risks to our forces and to

the civilian population.

It is important to note that both

General John Shalikashvili and General

Wesley Clark in testimony before

the Armed Services Committee agreed

that operating under United Nations

authority would tend to raise the

threshold for the Iraqis to use weapons

of mass destruction. Operating alone,

the United States runs the risk of Iraqi

gambling that international opinion

will not be as critical of Iraq in the employment

of these weapons.

If the first lesson of the gulf war is

don’t let the United States build up its

forces, the second lesson is don’t fight

the United States at long range in open

terrain. Our troops, training and technology

give us decisive advantages to

locate and destroy targets with integrated

fires at great range. The deserts

of Iraq are ideally suited for our forces

and will be the graveyard of the Iraqi

army if they chose to fight us there.

Unless the Iraqis learned nothing

from their defeat, they will not fight

our forces in the open. They likely will

conduct a strategic withdrawal to

Baghdad.,fighting at choke points like

rivers and urban areas. But, they may

also conduct a scorched earth policy as

they withdraw to slow us down and

deny us speedy avenues of approach to

Baghdad. Suddam ordered the oil fields

of Kuwait destroyed as his army fled.

He may do the same as his forces withdraw.

Moreover, since our major avenue

of approach is through Southern

Iraq, the traditional home of Iraqi Shiites,

Saddam is unlikely to have any

reluctance to inflict damage on a community

that he has always suppressed.

If Iraq forces can maintain any coherence

in the face of our assault, particularly

our air assaults, then they

will most likely make their major

stand in Baghdad. In the streets and

alleys of Baghdad, our technological

advantages are reduced. It would become

a more difficult battle.

The International Institute of Strategic

Studies reports that Iraq’s

‘‘wisest course would be to hunker

down in cities, distribute and hide its

forces, and fight from those places. It

cannot be assumed that the Iraqi Army

would deploy armour in the open

desert, as in 1990–91, firing from static

positions and presenting an immobile

target for airpower, as the Taliban did.

Many Iraqi weapons and command and

control centers will be placed near

apartments, hospitals, schools, and

mosques.’’

General Hoar testified at the Armed

Services Committee of a ‘‘nightmare

scenario’’ that needs to be planned

for—six Iraqi Republican Guard divisions

and six heavy divisions reinforced

with several thousand antiaircraft artillery

pieces defending the city of

Baghdad, resulting in urban warfare

with high casualties on both sides, as

well as the civilian populace.

We are all mindful that, during the

Gulf War, Saddam launched 39 Scud

missiles against Israel as a means to

provoke the Israelis to retaliate. It was

a desperate attempt to change the dynamic

of a war that was leading to a

humiliating defeat. He hoped that

Israel could be drawn into the war and

their involvement would cause the

Muslim world to abandon the international

coalition and rally to Saddam.

The Israelis did not take the bait. They

endured missile attacks, refrained from

retaliation and watched as coalition

forces dictated terms to a defeated

Iraq.

Given Saddam’s history and his options,

it is highly probable that he will

once again seek to draw Israel into the

conflict as a means of rallying the

Muslim world to his cause. He has a

limited number of missiles to fire at

Israel. However, it is likely that Palestinian

forces like Hamas and Hezbollah

will launch either sympathetic or explicitly

coordinated attacks against

Israel. This later dimension was not

such a formidable factor in 1991. Today,

the potential for suicide attacks and

widespread violence in the West Bank

and elsewhere in Israel is more pronounced.

According to Western and Israeli intelligence

sources, Hezbollah militants

in southern Lebanon are reported to

have amassed thousands of surface-to-surface

rockets with ranges sufficient

to strike cities in northern Israel.

The administration hopes that the

government of Israel will exercise the

same restraint that it showed in 1991.

That might be a forlorn hope. On September

26, Prime Minister Sharon said,

‘‘If Iraq attacks Israel, but does not hit

population centers of cause casualties,

our interest will be not to make it hard

on the Americans. If on the other hand,

harm is doneto Israel, if we suffer casualties

or if non-conventional weapons

of mass destruction are used against

us, then definitely Israel will take the

proper action to defend its citizens.’’

We all recognize the right of Israel to

defend itself. The Prime Minister’s

first responsibility is to his people.

But we also understand that Israeli

retaliation would put great pressure on

Muslim countries to either end any

support for United States efforts or to

actively oppose our efforts. Here again,

a strong argument can be made that an

operation sanctioned by the United Nations

might give these countries sufficient

justification to participate with

the international community rather

than oppose efforts to decisively deal

with Saddam.

We are prepared militarily to counter

all of these Iraqi threats. Our first priority

will be to establish an air defense

system to protect our forces as they

enter the region. Our ground based air

defense batteries and active aerial patrolling

will help mitigate any potential

Iraqi threat from the air. We have

had extensive collaboration with Israel

on the development of their Arrow air

defense system. This collaboration and

other collaborative efforts will be accelerated

to help ensure that any potential

Iraqi attack on Israel will be

frustrated.

In the conduct of offensive operations,

we will prepare the battlefield

with intensive air strikes. But, one of

the factors that must be considered in

this air campaign is the inadvertent release

of chemical or biological agents

as a result of our bombing. Press stories

suggest that the Iraqis have placed

sensitive installations in urban areas

as a way to protect them from the expected

air campaign. We could discover

that we have unwittingly created a

chemical or biological release that

would be exploited by the Iraqi government

not as confirmation of their

treachery but as an attack on our conduct

of the operation.

Indeed, the potential use of chemical

and biological weapons is one of the

great uncertainties of a battle against

Iraq. The President and Secretary

Rumsfeld are trying to dissuade Iraqi

field commanders from deploying these

weapons by sternly and correctly warning

them that they will be held accountable

for war crimes.

It is an open question whether this

warning will be effective with individuals

who owe their position and lives

to Saddam and who would likely face

swift and fatal retribution from Saddam

before they would be subject to

international law.

We are prepared to counter Iraqi responses

to our military operations.

But, there are certainly no guarantees

that we can do so without significant

casualties to our forces and to the civilian

population. Much of the Iraqi response

turns on the willingness of his

forces to resist and to follow his supposed

orders to employ weapons of

mass destruction. It is difficult to predict

these dimensions of loyalty and

morale. But, this battle seems likely to

produce more causalities and costs

than the Persian Gulf war for the simple

reason that the President has repeatedly

associated our use of force

with regime change. In a battle to remove

Saddam from power, his desperation

and the desperation of his loyalists

will cast this as a battle to the

death. Unfortunately, one of the hallmarks

of dictators is that many people

suffer and die, many innocent people,

before they meet their demise.

We will prevail in any battle against

Iraq. But, military victory brings with

it a host of other problems. Again, an

examination of these issues strongly

suggests that our tasks would be immensely

aided if we initiated our operations

with the broadest possible international

coalition vested with the authority

of the United Nations.

The Administration’s avowed policy

of ‘‘regime change’’ combined with the

discretion to wage a unilateral attack

on Iraq will inevitably lead to the indefinite

occupation of Iraq by United

States forces. Such an occupation will

be expensive and will impose significant

stress on our military forces that

are already ‘‘stabilizing’’ Afghanistan,

Bosnia, Kosovo, and other areas across

the Globe.

Moreover, governing Iraq is not one

of the easiest tasks. It is a country

with at least three major factions; the

Kurds in the North, Sunni Muslims in

the Center and Shiite Muslims in the

South. The potential for disintegration

along ethnic and religious lines is significant.

Our tasks in Iraq will be immensely

complicated by the probable damage

resulting from the military campaign.

Although we will deploy precision missions

and will be acutely conscious of

minimizing collateral damage, a

‘‘scorched earth’’ policy by the Iraqis

compounded by the possible release of

toxic agents and the possibility of extensive

combat in built-up areas may

lead to significant damage and significant

civilian casualities.

Again, after the battle, we would

look for international assistance to rebuild

Iraq. That assistance would be

more forthcoming if we initiated operations

with international support rather

than without it.

Even before calculating the costs of

postwar reconstruction of Iraq, we

must recognize that military operations

in Iraq will be expensive in direct

costs and could have significant

and detrimental effects on our economy.

Estimates of the direct cost of an attack

on Iraq range from $50 billion to

$200 billion. For perspective, the gulf

war cost about $80 billion in direct incremental

costs, and our allies paid

much of this expense.

Indirect effects on our economy are

hard to estimate, but there is great

concern that military operations in

Iraq will further complicate a fragile

economy.

One of the most potentially volatile

economic aspects of a war in Iraq will

be its effect on the price of oil. According

to the Congressional Research

Service, ‘‘the effect of a sudden and

sustained increase in the price of oil

could deepen an existing recession or

push an already weak economy into recession.’’

Our occupation of Iraq will place us

in control of the world’s second largest

oil reserves. Directly or indirectly, we

will become a major force in the international

politics of oil. That fact will

not be lost on other producing nations

and the world at large. There is a real

danger that our motivation to remove

Saddam will be ignored or quickly forgotten,

and our attack on Iraq will be

seen as old fashion imperialism. Once

again, this perception is most likely to

develop if we conduct our operations

unilaterally.

To date, the administration has not

publicly suggested how they intend to

deal with Iraqi oil. This is a major

issue of international importance

touching the economic, diplomatic and

security priorities of the world.

A unilateral attack by the United

States will engender worldwide criticism

as already suggested by the comments

of many leaders around the

world and reflected in public opinion in

many countries. A swift victory without

significant casualties or damage

will mute this criticism in many quarters,

but it will not easily extinguish

the resentment of our ‘‘go it alone’’

policy. A difficult and costly struggle

will accelerate this criticism and create

problems that will inhibit diplomatic

and economic progress on other

fronts.

One of the unintended consequences

of a unilateral assault on Iraq may be

our efforts on the War on Terror; the

unfinished business of completely destroying

Al Qaida before they strike us

again. Despite all the good faith assurances

of military leaders that they will

not lose focus on the War on Terrorism,

the scale of the proposed operation,

the notoriety and the huge risks

involved will inevitably draw resources

and attention from the War on Terror.

Further complicating our efforts on

the War of terror is the real possibility

that many countries that are now assisting

us will greet future requests

with studied indifference or denial.

The President asks for the authority

to use force unilaterally. This request

must be viewed in the context of the

newly promulgated National Security

Strategy. The core of this new strategy

rejects deterrence and embraces preemption.

According to this strategy, the

United States has long maintained the

option of preemptive actions to

counter a sufficient threat to our national

security. The greater the threat,

the greater the risk of inaction—and

the more compelling the case for taking

anticipatory action to defend ourselves,

even if uncertainty remains as

to the time and place of the enemy’s

attack. To forestall or prevent such

hostile acts by our adversaries, the

United States will, if necessary, act

preemptively.

There is no argument that the United

States, like every nation, retains the

right to defend itself from an imminent

hostile act. But, this strategy goes

much further. It appears to be based

not on the immediacy of a hostile act

but simply on the ‘‘sufficiency’’ of the

threat. It fails to make any distinction

based on the nature or timing of the

threat. As such, it can be applied or

misapplied to a wide range of adversaries.

There is no question that the United

States must act preemptively against

terrorist like al-Qaida. The nature of

the threat and the immediacy of the

threat leave no other option. Al-Qaida

has no significant and identifiable institutions,

resources or assets to hold

hostage as a means of changing behavior.

Al-Qaida has no significant and

identifiable institutions, resources or

assets to hold hostage as a means of

changing behavior. Al-Qaida makes on

pretense of attempting to participate

in the international system of nation

states. Al-Qaida is not motivated by

calculated self interest as much as it is

motivated by an apocalyptic impulse

for the destruction of its enemies and

the ritual sacrifice of its adherents.

There is no choice but to seek out

these terrorists and destroy them before

they attack us again.

But al-Qaida is different that many

threats that face us. And, extending

this notion of preemption and bolstering

it in resolutions that give the

President authority at his discretion to

conduct unilateral military operations

starts us down a potentially dangerous

path.

We are debating Iraq today, but will

we apply this preemptive doctrine to

Iran or North Korea tomorrow? How do

we prevent others from adopting this

same strategy if we have enshrined it

as the centerpiece of our policy? For

example, how to we counsel the Indians

to refrain from preemptively attacking

Pakistan or vice versa? From New

Delhi or Islamabad, the threat looks

‘‘sufficient’’ and striking first is enticing.

In this first test of the President’s

new National Security Strategy, we

should be very careful to define the

scope of his authority to avoid being

swept up in a doctrine that appears to

have few limits.

Our continuing confrontation with

Iraq is fraught with danger and challenge.

Much is uncertain, but I believe

that one point is quite clear. Leading

an international coalition to enforce

United Nations resolutions, as the

President spoke of in Cincinnati, is the

surest way to reduce the dangers and

ensure the long-term success of our

policy. It is for this reason that I support

the Levin resolution.

Great events will turn on our deliberations.

But, at this moment, my

thoughts are not on historic forces.

Rather, I think about the young Americans

who will carry out our policies.

They are prepared to sacrifice everything.

We owe them more than we can

ever repay. One thing that we certainly

owe them is our best judgment. I have

tried to give them mine.

I yield the floor.